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GERMANY'S NEWEST ALIENS: 
INTRODUCTION 
THE EAST GERMANS 
Peter O'Brien 
Trinity University 
Before 1989, Germans used the term "Wende " (the turn) to 
refer to the transition from the Schmidt to the Kohl government in 
1981-82. This meaning disappeared overnight between November 9 
and JO, 1989. The real Wende became the revolution in the GDR and 
the subsequent unification of the two Germanys. Doubtless this shift 
in meaning was justified. By October 1990, Germany had experi­
enced far more than a change in political leadership. It now had new 
expanded borders, 17 million new citizens, and a mountain of 
challenges to overcome. 
Among the myriad problems confronting Germany, migration 
was paramount. Indeed, it seems fair, in retrospect, to claim that 
migration (or the threat of it) inspired the revolution and determined 
the collapse of the GDR. Nor is it outlandish to suggest that migra­
tion set the pace and terms of unification. Once the Krenz regime 
opened the Berlin Wall and let its people vote with their feet, it had 
no real chance of surviving. Similarly, had Helmut Kohl not quickly 
promised reunification, he would have likely faced massive emigra­
tion from East Germans. 
A new nation-state was formed under the pressure of 
migration. In addition to the 17 million newcomers produced by 
unification on October 3, 1990, the FRG already had over 5 million 
foreign workers and refugees. Moreover, unusually large numbers 
of refugees from East Europe and elsewhere (nearly 500,000 in 
1992, alone') sought to take advantage of Germany's liberal laws 
regulating political asylum. These numbers imply that well over one 
quarter of united Germany's residents are migrants or newcomers of 
one sort or the other. There can be no denying that Germany has 
become a land of immigration. 
Anxiety has surfaced that Germany is reviving and reverting 
to an aggressive and atavistic racism in response to Iarge·scale 
emigration. Hundreds of books, articles and conferences in recent 
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years have addressed this theme.2 Both the number and intensity of 
criminal acts hostile to foreigners increased after unification (2426 
in 1991 to 6336 in 1992).3 According to the Agency for the Protec­
tion of the Constitution. the number of right-wing extremist groups 
rose from 76 in 1991 to 82 in 1992. encompassing an estimated 
41,900 members.4 One recent survey found that three quarters of 
polled Germans view the "foreigner problem" as the most important 
issue in Germany .5 In response to growing xenophobia, the 
Bundestag recently amended the constitution to toughen its article 
( 16) regarding political asylum. Germany again seems a place 
neither comfortable nor safe for non-Germans. 
This essay contends that these fears are exaggerated. I do not 
deny signs of resurgent racism or rising xenophobia. However, I 
insist that they do not signal a return to a Nazi or Nazi-like 
Germany. Rather, I argue that such sentiments have found little 
realization in legislation hostile to foreigners, particularly those 
living in the FRG. On the contrary, I show that much legislation has 
been passed or proposed which is beneficial to foreigners and even 
more which is hostile to (some) Germans both inside and outside the 
FRG. Put differently, if Germany needs a systematic policy of 
exclusion to deal with its migrant problem, there is not much 
evidence which points to a deliberate racist strategy. 
Does this mean there is no politics of exclusion evolving in 
Germany? No! I aim to show that the emerging politics of exclusion 
rests more on the principles of liberalism than on racism. In a recent 
essay Etienne Balibar discerns an emerging shift in the instruments 
and justifications of discrimination: 
It may well be that the current variants of neo­
racism are merely a transitional ideological 
formation, which is destined to develop towards 
discourses and social technologies in which the 
aspect of the historical recounting of genealogical 
myths (the play of substitutions between race, 
people, culture and nation) will give way ... to the 
aspect of psychological assessment of intellectual 
aptitudes and dispositions which a battery of 
cognitive, socio-psychological and statistical 
sciences would then undertake to measure, select 
and monitor, striking a balance between heredi-
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tary and environmental factors .... In other words, 
that ideological formation would develop towards 
a "post-racism."6 
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Building off Balibar, I suggest that a "post-racial" discrimina­
tion founded on liberalism is discernible in the new Germany. 
EUPHORIC NATIONALISM AND RESURGENT RACISM 
"What belongs together grows together." These volkisch­
sounding words uttered shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall by 
Willy Brandt - a man who fought much of his life against racism -
reveal the nearly irresistible appeal of German nationalism in 
November of 1989. One nation forcibly divided for four decades 
could again forge together. And most Germans felt, like Brandt, that 
it was only natural that Germans unite. The West Germans were as 
willing to welcome their eastern brethren as the East Germans were 
eager to visit the West. As the latter first crossed over they were met 
with much pageantry and 100 crisp D marks. The generosity 
persisted and intensified. The roughly 2.5 million Germans east of 
the FRG who decided to move to the West received extensive and 
expensive public assistance to help them resettle (over 10 billion DM 
in 1992).7 Moreover, they gained immediate and automatic citizen­
ship as stipulated in Article 116 of the Basic Law. The Germans who 
stayed in the GDR were offered an extraordinarily favorable 
exchange rate for their East German marks in July of 1990. Later on 
October 3, the day of unification, they became de facto citizens of 
the FRG rather than the mere de jure citizens they had been since 
1949. In addition, the Kohl administration announced after the 
general elections of 1991 that it would allocate some 100 billion DM 
(roughly one quarter of the federal budget) for reconstruction and 
improvements in the eastern provinces. 
Foreigners watched these developments with deep frustration. 
Integration had commenced in the Seventies but had progressed 
slowly. Foreigners (55% of whom have lived in the FRG for more 
than IO years, over one million of whom were born in the FRG, and 
all of whom combined pay roughly 90 billion DM annually in taxes) 
had been told time and again by Bonn that it would take a long time 
before they would "catch up" socio-economically with the West 
Germans.8 But the Chancellor promised East Germans, before any 
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of them paid a single tax, that he would bring West German socio­
economic standards to them in 5 short years. Although foreigners 
received some purely consultative political representation in various 
"Foreigners Councils," the German government had steadfastly 
refused for two decades to grant them even municipal voting rights.9 
Restrictive requirements for naturalization left the FRG with the 
lowest rate of naturalization in the industrial world. IO Yet, according 
to Article 116 of the Basic Law, the estimated 8 million Germans 
living in the former Soviet bloc enjoyed a right to immediate 
German citizenship. 
Put differently, the legislation aimed at Germans from the east 
was blatantly discriminatory and racist. Article 116 grants citizen­
ship on the basis of ethnicity rather than territory. The right of 
citizenship belongs to "everyone ... who, as a refugee or expellee of 
German ethnicity, or as a spouse or descendent of such persons, has 
been admitted to the territory of the German Reich as it existed on 
December 31, 1937."l l  In 1937, German ethnicity was defined by 
the racist Nuremberg Laws of 1935. This law and the practices it 
sanctioned also helped to fuel the increasing hostility toward foreign­
ers after unification. As Germans began to realize that the costs of 
unification would far exceed the optimistic projections of Chancellor 
Kohl in 1990, many began entertaining ideas of targeting foreigners 
as the ones who should bear the greatest hardships. Germans for 
whom unification turned sour (particularly youths in the east) looked 
to foreigners as scapegoats and began verbally to demand and even 
physically to ensure their elimination from the land. Although 
neither the. government nor the constitution ever sanctioned the 
maltreatment of foreigners, both sanctioned preferential treatment of 
Germans. Had the government further pursued or strengthened this 
policy, a systematic policy of discrimination based on race would 
have developed. But it did not. 
REVIVED LIBERALISM 
Opposition and limitations to racism soon sprang up from 
various quarters. Esteemed President Richard von Weizsacker led 
the way by frequently condemning xenophobic acts and attitudes. In 
the summer of 199 I, Liselotte Funcke, Kohl's Commissioner for 
Alien Affairs, resigned in bitter and public protest over the unfair 
treatment of foreigners. Kohl himself called the riots in Restock "a 
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national disgrace." Hundreds of other prominent personalities 
publicly condemned xenophobia and praised the idea of a "multi­
cultural society."12 Average German citizens organized demonstra­
tions for foreigners far larger in numbers than those against them 
(such as the mass candlelight marches against racist violence). 
Practical considerations also discredited a purely racist 
approach. Demographic and economic studies commissioned by the 
government have consistently concluded that Germany's economy 
will continue to depend on the long-term presence of foreign labor 
into the foreseeable future. t l Furthermore, poorly trained East 
German workers could hardly be expected productively to replace 
foreigners who had been on the job for years. Countless studies 
reported rates of productivity among East German workers far 
below rates in counterpart industries in the west (on average, 
50% ).14 Nor could resident aliens simply be sent home. At the time 
of unification, for example, 70% of them possessed the irrevocable 
residence entitlement. IS Diplomatically, the government's hands 
were tied as well. Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome guarantees all 
members of the European Union the right to work and reside in 
Germany. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty provided for local 
voting rights for these 1.5 million EU members residing in the FRG. 
Meanwhile, the European Council took steps in 1993 to make dual 
citizenship easier (and therefore migrant naturalization more likely) 
in member states. t 6 EU members are not the only ones well 
protected. A Treaty signed with Turkey in 1972 prohibits Germany 
from forcibly deporting any of the nearly 2 million Turks in the 
land (so long as they do not violate laws). A treaty signed with 
Poland in 1991 allows Poles to travel in Germany without a visa. 
Most importantly, the Basic Law has many protections for foreign­
ers. The basic civil liberties of the first 19 Articles are guaranteed to 
all persons, not just to Germans, and the courts have consistently 
struck down policies which violate foreigners' rights.17 If Germany 
needed a strategy to deal with its migration crisis, in other words, an 
overtly racist one proved neither feasible nor desirable. 
In fact, the only legislation passed since 1990 which is 
blatantly hostile to foreigners is the revision of the asylum laws in 
July of 1993. However, this is designed adversely to affect primarily 
refugees residing outside the FRG after July. All applicants for 
political asylum who enter Germany from countries complying with 
the Geneva Convention for Refugees and the European Rights 
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Convention will automatically be sent back to the departed country. 
In addition, the German government has stipulated the same policy 
for all countries which it deems politically "safe;" and all nine of the 
FRG' s contiguous neighbors have earned the distinction. Practically, 
thi,s means that all refugees who enter Germany via land routes are 
turned away. Moreover, all applicants in foreign countries must now 
apply at the German Embassy in their country and await a decision 
there. The policy is clearly designed to stop refugees before they 
enter the FRG, since 95% of them are on average denied asylum. 
The new law appears to be working. During the first year after it 
went into effect, the number of new applicants dropped from 
438,191 in 1992 to 322,600 in 1993 to 127,210 in 1994.18 
The new law, however, is not nearly as tough on the roughly 
one million applicants already in the FRG. Their basic welfare must, 
under Article 16 of the constitution, be guaranteed until their appli­
cation is complete. And even once rejected - a process which often 
takes years to complete - appeals and stays are not impossible. For 
instance, during the winter of 1994-95, the Ministry of Interior 
placed a three-month moratorium on the expulsion of rejected 
Kurdish refugees and established a bilateral commission with Ankara 
to monitor the treatment of Kurdish returnees.19 Of course, the new 
law affects in no way the nearly 6 million resident aliens in the FRG. 
Recently, regulations regarding ethnic Germans living outside 
the FRG have tightened. For instance, after July, 1991, ethnic 
Germans have been required to apply for visas to Germany in their 
homelands rather than simply show up at the border claiming the 
rights of Article 1I6. The Supreme Administrative Court has ruled 
that ethnic Germans living in lands which guarantee the rights of 
German minorities (for instance, Poland) should no longer expect to 
receive automatic asylum or citizenship based on Article 116. And in 
1992, the Kohl administration established an annual limit of 220,000 
ethnic Germans permitted to naturalize. Social services available to . 
the German newcomers were also reduced to six months of language 
training and no more than 15 months of social welfare payments. 
These new measures have discouraged German immigration; the rate 
in 1994 was 56% of the figure for 1992 and 90% for 1993.20
As for new legislation aimed at non-German immigrants, it is 
mostly beneficial to them. On January 1, 1991, a new Aliens Law 
went into effect. The law substantially liberalizes the requirements 
for citizenship. Under its provisions, aliens under the age of 23 (over 
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2 million) have a right to naturalize so long as they have resided in 
Germany at least 8 years, attended school there for 6, and not been 
convicted of a felony (Paragraph 85). Those 23 and older have to 
have lived in Germany at least 15 years, not have been convicted of a 
felony, and not be collecting social assistance (Paragraph 86). 
Moreover, in the wake of the fatal arson attack on a refugee dormi­
tory in Solingen in 1993, the Kohl government responded with a 
proposal to grant automatic German citizenship to children under 18 
whose parents have lived in Germany for at least 10 years and one of 
whose parents was born in the FRG. The youngsters (roughly one 
million) are allowed to possess dual citizenship until they turn 18, at 
which time they must.relinquish one or the other. 
Efforts to curb xenophobia have increased. Since 1989, state 
and federal governments have banned 1 0  neo-Nazi organizations,21 
and in 1995, a state court in Karlsruhe sentenced Gunter Deckert, the 
leader of the far right-wing National Democratic Party of Germany, 
to two years imprisonment for inciting fear. A year earlier, the 
Federal Constitutional Court ruled that denial of the Holocaust is not 
protected under freedom of expression. A year before that, 
parliament amended the Victims Indemnity Law to make foreign 
victims equal to Germans for benefits. In 1994, Kohl's government 
successfully proposed that the Bundestag expand the powers of the 
police and intelligence service to apprehend even more right-wing 
extremists as well as ban neo-Nazi symbols from public. The 
measures have proven effective. From 1993 to 1994, the number of 
reported hostile acts against foreigners halved.22 
We should be careful not to conclude from these developments 
that foreigners enjoy an equal status with West Germans. Statisti­
cally, their standard of living continues to lag behind that of West 
Germans.23 Resident aliens cannot enjoy full rights of political 
participation unless they naturalize. Nevertheless, it is undeniable 
that most of the legislation passed since unification concerning 
foreigners in Germany has been based on liberal principles which 
condemn discrimination on the basis of race, nation, or creed. 
INTEGRATION 
No group, save the convicted neo-Nazis, experienced the 
minimal racial solidarity in Germany after unification more than the 
East German newcomers. What was originally celebrated as the 
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coming together of a divided people soon became experienced as a 
takeover by foreign invaders. And words like "invasion" and 
"colonization" are now commonly heard in reference to unification. 
Like foreigners, East Germans live below the West German standard 
of living (for example, 70% of the average West German household 
income24 and 27% of the average household's total assets25) and now 
hear from officials that this is likely to persist for at least a genera­
tion. Like foreigners, East Germans suffer higher rates of 
unemployment than West Germans (13.5% and 8.2% respectively at 
the close of 199426). And as foreigners did throughout the Seventies 
and Eighties, East Germans have begun to organize among therp­
selves to protest their situation. Nearly 20% of them voted for the 
successor party to East Germany's Communist Party (PDS) in the 
federal elections October, 1994. 
These similarities are not superficial. They stem from the fact 
that East Germans and foreigners are both the objects of deliberate 
campaigns of integration, and as such politically subordinate to West 
Germans. The politically subordinate position of foreigners is 
obvious and easy to explain: as aliens they do not enjoy full rights of 
political participation. The subordination of East Germans is more 
complicated because they are citizens. However, unification involved 
the systematic political subordination of East Germans. In the first 
place, West German political parties and personalities dominated the 
first free election in the GDR (spending a total of 40 million DM). 
The CDU and SPD captured over 60% of the vote compared to 2.9% 
for New Forum and Democracy Now. Referring to the influence of 
the West German parties, former East Berlin mayor pfarrer Albertz 
remarked: "An invasion would have been more honest."27 
Dominating both regimes, Christian Democrats were able to 
structure unification as they wanted. The choice to annex the eastern 
provinces, as allowed in Article 23 of the Basic Law, meant not only 
that no new constitution would be drafted, but also that the condi­
tions of unification would not have to be ratified in a national 
plebiscite. Moreover, the East Germans were integrated into a 
federal structure in which they represented a minority vis-a-vis West 
Germans in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat. A survey taken in 
Berlin in December of 1990 found that 42.4% of polled East 
Germans felt shut out of the unification negotiations, while another 
36.7% felt they were merely onlookers.28 
GERMANY'S NEWEST ALIENS 457 
The Treaty of Unification gave sweeping power to Bonn. Most 
notably, Article 25 placed under the auspices of the Finance Ministry 
the Trust Agency, which controlled all East German industry. The 
entire civil service was to be changed so as to emulate the West 
German public sector (Article 20). Furthermore, the Treaty stipu­
lated that East German public servants could be dismissed if they 
were deemed incompetent, were no longer needed, had violated 
internationally recognized principles of humanity, or had worked for 
the GDR's Ministry of State Security or Office of National 
Security .29 The Treaty opened the way for a total restructuring of 
East Germany. 
Although this process of integrating East Germany and East 
Germans into the Federal Republic has been far more dramatic and 
drastic than the process of integrating foreigners, the two processes 
share significant similarities. After the recession of 1966-67, the 
West German government decided to terminate its practice of 
"rotating" guest-workers back to their homelands after two years. 
Businesses had complained that their investment in foreign laborers 
only really paid off after a year or two of training. The Ministry of 
Labor then initiated the practice of liberally awarding long-term and 
unlimited work permits to foreigners. Thus began the gradual 
process of integrating foreigners into the labor market as permanent 
workers. And although this integration has proceeded slowly at 
times, it has proceeded steadily.30 
East Germans too had to be integrated into the West German 
labor market after October 3, 1990. Although the campaign often 
has entailed the full-scale absorption of East German organizations 
and enterprises into their West German counterpans (for instance, in 
the case of the meclia3I or organized labor32), its most consequential 
feature has been the systematic de-industrialization of the eastern 
provinces. Between 1989 and 1991, the GDP in what some have 
termed Germany's Mezzogiorno 33 declined 40%, industrial produc­
tion 70%, employment 40%. While East Germans comprise over 
20% of Germany's population, East German GDP by 1994 
constituted only 7.9% of the total GDP, 2% of ei<ports.34 As the 
Trust Agency privatized its roughly 13,000 firms, the new owners 
typically "down-sized" the personneJ.35 By 1993, more than half of 
the jobs which existed in 1989 in East Germany had disappeared.36 
By 1992, only 31 % of East Germans had continued working uninter­
ruptedly in the same position they held before unification. In 1989, 
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9.5 million people were employed in East Germany; in 1994 6 
million. 13.5% of eligible workers are officially unemployed; yet 
another 20% work in the various "job-creation" positions slotted for 
eventual termination. Over l million East Germans have fled west 
and about 500,000 commute to the west.37 
Integrating the public sector into the FRG has likewise entailed 
massive changes. The overwhelming majority of East German laws 
and procedures were invalidated overnight. Courts and police offices 
had to enforce new laws. Welfare agencies had to provide different 
services. Schools and universities had to adopt new curricula. 
Generally, this has taken place by retraining, replacing or terminat­
ing personnel. And for the most part, it has been West Germans who 
have made these critical decisions. By late 1992, roughly 1400 
western federal and 8400 western state administrators were working 
in leadership positions in the east.38 By 1993 in Brandenburg, for 
example, 52% of high-level civil servants were West Germans, 73% 
in the Chancellery, 72% in the Ministry of Justice, 67% in the 
Ministry of Finance. Each of the eastern provinces have West 
German "partner provinces" which regularly send public servants to 
the east to provide aid and assistance. During 1993, for instance, 
North Rhine-Westphalia sent 22% (956) of its top civil servants to 
help in Brandenburg.39 On the inverse side, 200,000 East Germans 
left their public-service jobs by October, 1992.40 
The education system has witnessed similar changes. The 
Science Council and the Commissions on High School Structure in 
each province, all of which became dominated by West Germans, 
were charged with remaking the system of higher education and 
scientific research in East Germany after the image of West 
Germany. With the powers granted them by Article 38 of the Treaty 
of Unification, the two bodies launched extensive reforms in 
curricula and personnel. Entire disciplines in the humanities and 
social sciences deemed to be "close to the regime" of the GDR were 
either eliminated or fully restructured. In these disciplines, one study 
concluded, "today there are hardly any professors from the east 
left." The other disciplines experienced major personnel, if not 
curricular changes. The same study estimates that in these disciplines 
roughly one-third of the academic positions are held by West 
Germans.41 The number of positions available in the many non­
teaching research institutes of East Germany dropped from 31,000 in 
1991 to 13,500 in 1994.42 Similar drastic changes took place in the 
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secondary and primary schools as well as the public cultural and 
athletic institutions.43 
West Germans wound up possessing and wielding far more 
power in East Germany than most East Germans originally expected. 
In September of 1990, roughly 7% of polled East Germans opposed 
the importation of West German elites; by November of 1992, the 
figure had risen to 34%. Indeed, West Germans residing in the east 
tied with Turks in the survey for the least liked newcomers in the 
eastern provinces.44 As early as 1991, 49% of questioned East 
Germans felt that most of their erstwhile compatriots viewed unifi­
cation as a mistake.45 By 1995, 16% of polled East Germans (in 
contrast to 47% of polled West Germans) said they were satisfied 
with Germany's corpus of laws;46 53% claimed unification had 
turned out "worse than I expected;" and 72% considered themselves 
"second-class citizens. "47 
Although far less drastic than the campaign aimed at East 
Germans, West German elites initiated a campaign in the early 
Seventies to get control of foreigners' institutions. After the dramatic 
wildcat strike in the Ford Factory in Cologne in 1973, during which 
Turkish workers broke off contact with JG Metal, the DGB made a 
conscious effort to integrate foreign workers into the German 
unions. By 1982, Turkish workers were more unionized than 
Germans (48% to 40%; 33.6% for all migrant laborers).48 
Once the Labor Ministry stopped the practice of rotating 
guest-workers back to their homelands, the number of foreigners in 
Germany increased dramatically (from 1.3 million in 1966 to 4.5 
million in 1980). Now permanently employed, foreign workers 
naturally wished to bring their families to West Germany. By 1971, 
35% of foreigners (more than 1 million) were dependents. In I 972, 
the Ministry of Labor launched an official campaign for the 
"Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families." The policy 
largely involved extending the wide net of the welfare state to take in 
foreigners.49 By roughly 1980, foreigners enjoyed the same social 
welfare benefits as West Germans.SO 
In the late Seventies, much public concern surfaced over the 
existence of some 1000 mosques and Koran schools in Germany. 
Officials feared that Muslim pupils were being taught norms and 
values there which were anathema to the liberal democratic princi­
ples taught in the public schools. In 1980, North Rhine-Westphalia 
became the first province to offer Islamic alongside Catholic and 
460 EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY 
Evangelical instruction in the public schools. Most provinces with 
large foreign populations soon followed suit. Indeed, all schools in 
Germany with large numbers of foreign pupils now utilize a special 
"foreigner pedagogy" to integrate the migrants into the general 
curriculum. Local and provincial governments have also since the 
late Seventies offered governmental subsidies to Islamic (and other 
migrant) organizations which agree to operate in accordance with the 
liberal principles enunciated in the Basic Law.51 
LIBERAL AND ILLIBERAL CITIZENS 
Both foreigners and East Germans receive considerable social, 
economic and cultural support from the Federal Republic as target 
groups of integration, but at the price of political equality, whether 
de facto or de jure, with West Germans. West German leaders can 
tolerate (and rationalize) this inequality because they cast East 
Germans and foreigners as different, deviant, deficient. Both 
campaigns of integration, in other words, create and rely on the 
proverbial negative "Other." "Integration," "assimilation," 
"incorporation" - all common terms applied to both campaigns -
make no sense unless there is a foreigner - someone different from 
West Germans - who needs to be integrated. And what makes them 
different is an alleged absence of an internalized commitment to the 
liberal principles on which the republic is founded. 
Since unification, West German social scientists (often with the 
financial support of government) have carried out numerous studies 
of the political culture of East Germans. During the Seventies and 
Eighties, West German social scientists (often with the financial 
support of government) carried out numerous studies of the political 
culture of foreigners. These studies share unmistakable similarities 
and produce virtually identical images of their subjects. First, 
foreigners and East Germans are persons who have been socialized 
in authoritarian political cultures outside the FRG. Second, they are 
persons experiencing rapid social change. Third, they suffer from a 
number of social and psychological pathologies, one of which is a 
tendency toward anti-democratic political extremism. And fourth, 
they represent a threat to the "basic free democratic order" of the 
FRG and must be re-socialized to respect the liberal democratic 
values of West German political culture before they can be fully 
trusted. 
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Kurt Sontheimer's analysis of East German political culture 
typifies the view common among West German social scientists. He 
insists that the old pre-war authoritarian political culture survived in 
the GDR despite the transformation to communism: "This official 
political culture sanctioned by the Party and State thus built off 
German traditions ... of the leading Party and of the State with a 
decided priority over the needs and tendencies of the individual." 
Furthermore, their political culture was "tainted more strongly than 
that of the Federal Republic with traditional attitudes which came out 
of German history. Thus the GDR society appeared in the judgment 
of some observers 'more German' than the quickly modernizing and 
Americanizing Federal Republic."52 
West German studies invariably note the major differences 
between the predominant norms and values in the FRG and in the 
GDR and emphasize the great difficulties East Germans face in 
adapting to their new society. "There exists a significant discrep­
ancy," concluded a study commissioned by the Federal Agency for 
AU-German Efforts, "between the behavioral repertoire of the 
erstwhile GDR citizens and the new challenges. The mental demands 
which pluralistic democracy and social market economy place on 
social actors are totally different. "53 Another study implored readers 
to keep in mind "that 16 million GDR citizens have with the regime 
and system transformation lost their identity overnight. "54 Both 
studies conclude that East Germans suffer from various social and 
psychological problems such as a "collapse of a holy, ordered 
world," "anomie," "culture shock," "identity vacuum" which stem 
from feeling like "a foreigner in one's own land." They exhibit such 
symptoms as "depression," "GDR nostalgia," "self-doubt," "suicide," 
"excessive consumption" and "criminality." 
But the most disturbing deviance is a tendency to support 
political extremism, far right or left. Thus countless studies interpret 
the rise in neo-Nazi activities and organizations in East Germany as a 
reaction against rapid social change combined with deficient 
appreciation of liberal democratic norms and values. For example, 
Hans-Gerd Jaschke writes: "the reasons for the increase in the 
number of right-wing extremists seem to be ... the feeling of social 
discrimination, the lack of other traditionally established political 
orientations, the lack of experience in dealing with strangers and 
practical everyday problems.SS "The sum total of all the frustra­
tions," concludes another study, "becomes vented in slogans like 
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'Germany for the Germans - Foreigners out!' Violent hooligans and 
applauding observers do not want to accept that indigent refugees, 
victims of political persecution or religious minorities are being 
integrated into the commonwealth. Instead, the alleged uniform, 
homogeneous society is preferred. "56 Others see persistent suppon 
for the PDS as evidence that the "authoritarian-repressive structures 
of the society have not yet really been overcome. "57 The same holds 
true for "GDR nostalgia." "This can be interpreted as a 'new myth of 
the social welfare in the former GDR' and hints at a political 
instability in the eastern pan of Germany, comparable to the one in 
the FRG in the 1960s. "58 The conclusion to be drawn from these 
various studies is that East Germans have yet to become genuine 
liberal democrats: 
Citizens of the former GDR have already 
developed affective ties to their new political 
community. However, these are not overflow con­
sequences from satisfaction with politics and 
democracy or primarily politically motivated. On 
the contrary, they are either rooted in historical 
experience and social relations or closely linked to 
the economic benefits that are expected from 
belonging to this political community. With 
regard to this latter aspect these ties will be 
affected by any disappointment of economic 
hopes.59 
This image of East Germans mirrors the one of foreigners 
produced by social scientists during the Seventies and Eighties. The 
many scholars who moved into so-called "foreigner research" in 
those decades diagnosed foreigners with vinually the same socio­
psychological illnesses and pathologies discussed above. Moreover, 
the root cause was understood to be the rapid transformation from 
traditional agricultural societies to the modern industrial society of 
the FRG. Thus Ursula Neumann in a prominent study of migrant 
families argued that their tendency to cling to tradition in Germany: 
is not to be understood as a natural continuation 
of the lifestyle in the homeland, rather as a 
defense against the changed environment. The 
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confrontation with the divergent ways of the 
surrounding world creates in every case a sense of 
uncertainty, a strain on the personality. [This 
leads] to signs of retreat and compensation, such 
as exaggeration of traditional norms and values, 
idealization of the homeland, avoidance of contact 
with the German environment.60 
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And as later with East Germans, political extremism among foreign­
ers, particularly Turks, became a major concern of West Germans.61 
Several Turkish migrant organizations were placed under surveil­
lance by the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution during the 
Eighties just as several East German organizations have been since 
unification. Both major political parties took hard stances against 
political extremism as well as suffrage for migrants. The SPD 
demanded that "the activities of anti-democratic and criminal 
migrant organizations ... be monitored with all available legal and 
organizational means" and concluded that "the introduction of 
municipal voting rights [for foreigners] does not seem sensible at this 
time. "62 The CDU declared: 
If the franchise were granted, the participation of 
foreign national parties in elections could not be 
avoided. Whoever in recent months has pursued 
the excesses of foreign extremism in the Federal 
Republic - the buzzwords Kurdish terrorism and 
the appearance of fanatical Turkish nationalists 
suffice - knows that the last thing we need is 
campaign battles between left-wing and right­
wing extremist foreign parties in the Federal 
Republic. 63 
Although such repressive and restncuve measures are 
appropriate in the short-run, they will not do in the long-run. Only 
thorough re-socialization of newcomers can fully secure the demo­
cratic order. In 1978, the Federal Commissioner for Aliens 
announced that education would represent the "focal point" of the 
Schmidt administration's immigration policy. The reason, he ex­
plained, was that the internalization of liberal democratic norms and 
values was essential if foreigners were to reside in Germany 
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permanently; and only the schools could be expected to teach these 
norms and values.64 The CDU insisted that full integration ultimately 
had to mean an internalized respect for "the human dignity and value 
structure of our constitution" and urged making the distinction 
between superficial "outer assimilation" and genuine "inner assimila­
tion." The latter could only come after a long process of socialization 
in the public schools.65 It is not surprising, then, that both parties 
support more liberal naturalization requirements for young foreign­
ers schooled in Germany than for older ones schooled in the 
homeland. 
The re-socialization of East Germans can also be expected to 
take a long time, West Germans insist. Hans-Joachim Maaz writes in 
his study of East German political culture: "Democracy cannot ... be 
put on like a coat, rather it must take root in the minds and hearts .... 
Democracy can only prevail ... if it begins in the souls of men."66 
Katharina Belwe argues that "it will take a longer individual and 
collective learning process before the East German citizens can be 
made equal to the citizens of the old federal states in competition for 
jobs but also political and social positions."67 
Such rationalizations of postponed equality for East Germans 
sound unmistakably similar to those resident aliens have heard for 
years. Delaying full sovereignty to newcomers seems natural to West 
Germans. After World War II, they were welcomed into the western 
alliance of liberal democratic nation-states, but not as fully sovereign 
members. As the Allies built the Federal Republic and integrated it 
into the western alliance, they only gradually relinquished 
sovereignty to West Germany. They first had to be satisfied not only 
that liberal democratic structures and institutions were in place, but 
that a liberal democratic political culture was widely internalized by 
the citizenry. West Germans are simply doing to East Germans and 
foreigners what was once done to themselves. And since the latter is 
generally understood as a grand success story, there seems no good 
reason not to repeat (actually extend) the process of converting more 
newcomers to the nation state to its core liberal democratic values. 
This mode of thinking receives clear expression in the following 
passage of a major study on East German political culture 
commissioned by the Federal Ministries for Technology and 
Research and for Labor and Social Order: 
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The development of a stable democracy needs 
time. So it was after the Second World War in 
West Germany. Democratization is a long-term 
process. This is true in particular for the 
development of a democratic political culture .... 
The population of the former GDR initially 
oriented itself mainly around the living standards 
of the old Federal Republic ... and not very much 
around the democratic values. The development 
of a democratic value system will demand consid­
erable time. These developments thoroughly 
correspond to the experiences in the old Federal 
Republic following the war.68 
CONCLUSION 
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I have stressed the similarities in the treatment and perception 
of foreigners and East Germans with two points in mind. First, since 
East and West Germans do have race and nation in common and East 
Germans and foreigners do not, racism or volkisch nationalism 
cannot be the ideological source of the inequality both experience 
vis-a-vis West Germans. Second, if, as I have argued, it is the alleged 
illiberalism of East Germans and foreigners which distinguishes 
them from West Germans, then liberalism (more accurately, the 
conviction on the part of West German leaders that they are genuine 
liberals and the others are not) ideologically motivates and rational­
izes the inequality between the groups. And this suggests that 
Balibar's "post-racism," in this case based on a distinction between 
liberal and illiberal traits, is operating in united Germany as an 
"ideological formation" rationalizing inequality. 
A focus on post-racism can significantly change the way we 
view united Germany and its relations with the many non-Germans 
in and around it who wish to reside there. From the popular premise 
of enduring German racism, we should expect united Germany to 
show preference toward Germans both inside and outside the FRG 
and disdain toward non-Germans both inside and outside of the FR G. 
But as I have argued, this simplistic reading fails to account for the 
real statuses of privileged and under-privileged enjoyed or suffered 
in united Germany. 
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A post-racist premise, by contrast, offers a more nuanced 
reading which more accurately reflects the actual distinctions and 
discriminations being made. Put differently, if we view Germany as 
a state endeavoring to protect and promote its liberal identity (that is, 
as a predominantly liberal rather than German nation state), the 
distinctions governing formal and informal access to the socio­
economic, political and cultural privileges in Germany become 
clearer and more comprehensible. 
The least privileged group comprises those currently residing 
outside the FRG. For the most part, they are to be kept out because 
they are seen to represent a potential strain on the economy and 
threat to the liberal democratic political system. This policy has its 
origins in the halt in the recruitment of foreign workers in 1973 and 
has found most recent expression in the Schengen Agreement and the 
revision of the law governing political asylum. However, as we saw, 
the policy has also been directed at ethnic Germans living outside the 
FRG through the annual limit placed on the number admitted. 
Not all "outsiders," however are unwelcome. Those deemed 
beneficial to the economy enjoy superior rights of access. All 
members of the EU may work and reside in Germany at will 
because, as members, they are assumed already to have been 
integrated into liberal societies in their homelands. Still other 
outsiders receive selective access based on changing economic needs. 
For instance, the Friendship Treaty with Poland in 1991 made pro­
vision for the granting of a specified number of temporary work 
permits for Poles to fill seasonal labor shortages. Nor is economic 
gain the only criterion used to distinguish between welcome and 
unwelcome outsiders. The revised asylum law, for instance, still 
grants political refuge to anyone who qualifies as a political as 
opposed to an economic refugee. And this is because offering a safe 
haven for the politically persecuted is seen as one defining character­
istic of a liberal society. Similarly, the immediate family members of 
resident aliens enjoy the right to immigrate under Article 6 of the 
Basic Law which protects the sanctity of the family - yet another 
integral value of a liberal society. 
Further distinctions based on liberal traits apply to those 
already residing in the FRG. As we saw, neither resident aliens nor 
East Germans (as groups) enjoy full de jure or de facto political and 
socio-economic equality with West Germans. And this is because 
they are seen (portrayed) as persons who have yet completely to 
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internalize the requisite norms and values of liberal citizens. They 
are to be assisted (often at considerable expense to the state) in 
becoming bona fide liberals (better students, better workers, better 
democrats, better neighbors, etc.) but should neither expect nor be 
allowed to enjoy all the same rights and privileges of West Germans 
until the liberalizing mission is complete. 
This leaves, of course, the West Germans, understood as those 
who were citizens of the FRG before the major changes stemming 
from the revolutions of 1989 commenced. Their rights and privi­
leges are to be endangered and disturbed as little as possible as 
Germany adjusts to the dramatically new environment in Europe. 
Yet this group is not unchanging. It would appear to include East 
Germans who can convincingly demonstrate their liberal credentials 
through rapid assimilation to West German ways (for instance, in the 
marketplace or in politics) but also increasing numbers of non­
Germans. The New Aliens Law of 1991 has made naturalization (and 
thus equal .. rights of political 'participation) for non-Germans much 
easier as has the toleration of dual citizenship since 1993. Further­
more, if strides toward genuine European citizenship continue to be 
made by the EU, Germany stands either directly or indirectly to add 
millions of non-German citizens to its ranks. United Germany, in 
other words, is not likely to become a predominantly German 
nation-state in the future. It is likely to remain, however, a predomi­
nantly liberal nation state in which key distinctions and statuses are 
increasingly determined not on the basis of race, nation, or creed, 
but rather on the post-racist basis of (il)liberal traits and aptitudes. 
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